

Second-Person Christian Practices in Virtue Formation

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ABSTRACT

Anyone who has learned to dance properly, or to sing or play music with another person, will know that the beginning of the process is rarely much fun. But there comes a point of qualitative transformation, an interpersonal resonance in which we (for we are then truly ‘we’) became more than two individuals. We enjoy a perfect and immediate union and fly along without losing our individuality. In my paper, I argue that we have access to such an interaction with God the Paraclete, meaning “the one called alongside.” In this scenario, our musical score is provided by the great liturgical texts hallowed by tradition, such the Psalms of the Divine Office, and our shared attention with God is enabled by the gifts and infused virtues of the life of grace. By such divine gifts, celebrated by Christians of a wide diversity of Western and Eastern traditions, we can become godlike and prepared for heavenly communion.

Introduction

Can second-person Christian practices play a role in generating and strengthening Christlike virtues? Even the phrasing of such a question should be puzzling. After all, what is a “second-person practice” and is this something properly basic or reducible to something else? Whatever it is, the reference to the second person implies some kind of intimacy involved in an interaction between ‘I’ and ‘you’. But in the case of the divine, does this suggestion of intimacy contradict the remoteness of God implied by much traditional theology? Moreover, if these questions can be answered, what connection exists between second-person relatedness and virtue formation, and how can this connection be realized in practice?

As regards the first question, a special role for the first-person perspective has been recognized at least as far back as the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* but a special role for the second-person perspective is a relatively new conception, the modern origins of which are most famously traced to the “second Copernican Revolution” of Martin Buber.¹ Drawing from Buber and a wide range of more contemporary research, I shall assume that this perspective is properly basic in human experience and, indeed, plausibly plays a central role in all kinds of human cognitive, linguistic, and social development.

As is well known, instead of the Cartesian *ego*, Buber placed the dialogical *I-Thou* relation at the heart of the human experience and what it means to be a human person in relation to other human persons. Consistent with his religious background, Buber also added a theological perspective in which ‘Thou’ corresponds to God revealed. The easiest way to appreciate what this perspective means is to start with an example, the following famous passage from Augustine’s *Confessions* X, p. 183,²

Late have I loved you, beauty so ancient and so new!
Late have I loved you!
And behold, you were within, but I was outside and looked for you there,
and in my ugliness I seized upon these beautiful things that you have made.
You were with me, but I was not with you.
Those things held me far away from you—
things that would not even exist if they were not in you.
You called, you shouted, and you broke through my deafness;
you flashed, you shone, and you dispersed my blindness;
you breathed perfume, and I drew in my breath and pant for you;
I tasted, (cf. Ps. 33:9; 1 Pet. 2:3) and I hunger and thirst; (cf. Mt. 5:6; 1 Cor. 4:11)
you touched me, and I was set on fire for your peace. (cf. Ps. 4:9)

¹ Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (T. & T. Clark, 1937). The phrase “Second Copernican Revolution” to describe Buber’s work can be found in Robert E. Wood, *Martin Buber’s Ontology: An Analysis of I and Thou*, Illustrated edition (Northwestern University Press, 1969). I note in passing that Buber in fact identifies Feuerbach as the discover of the *Thou*. See Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2002), p. 176.

² Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. by Thomas Williams (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2019).

When at last I cling to you with all that I am,
there will be no place in me for pain and struggle; (cf. Ps. 89:10)
my life will be wholly alive, filled wholly with you.

This passage is one of very many instances in the *Confessions* in which Augustine addresses God as ‘you’, while denoting himself as ‘I’. Augustine writes not simply as a supplicant or someone who loves God in the manner of some lofty philosophical aspiration. Augustine writes as someone who is passionately *in love* with God, with the person of his affection denoted as ‘you’ being as unique and non-transferable as ‘I’. This mode of addressing God is at least rare in classical antiquity and is absent from any work of Aristotle. In the case of Augustine, this relationship is one of divine love or friendship.

The testimony of Scripture, however, suggests that friendship with God is typically a long, difficult and often costly achievement, the fruition of a long personal relationship with God.³ While Augustine does indeed manifest a deepening friendship with God, plausibly most Christians belong in a broader category of relating to God in a personal way that is not yet friendship. Even the disciples of Jesus who left everything to follow him were not called his friends until the evening of the Last Supper. In this broader state, one is fully a Christian disciple with an intimacy with God expressed in a vast range of Christian prayers, such as the *Our Father*. Such persons are oriented towards friendship with God, but this friendship is not yet fully attained. A great number of Christians plausibly exist in this state, which I will call in this paper a state of *second-person relatedness* with respect to God.⁴

Is it possible to give a more precise account of what is meant by second-person relatedness? One only uses second-person grammatical forms in situations of mutual personal presence, and it has a peculiarity, namely that what is denoted by ‘I’ and ‘you’ respectively switches depending on who is speaking. This relatedness is also oriented to friendship and hence communion, which distinguishes it from situations in which one of the parties is hostile to the other, as in the case of the dialogue between Satan and God at the beginning of the Book of Job 1:7-12.

During the early twenty-first century, stimulated by the pioneering work of Buber, progress on second-person relatedness between human persons has been carried out in the context of what is called *shared* or *joint attention*. These interactions are commonplace in daily life, but they are especially apparent in the shared interactions of young children with one another or with their parents or caregivers. Young children typically interact with other persons in such a way as to share awareness of shared focus with others. Common examples include recognizing faces and smiling back, raising hands to be lifted

³ Examples are Abraham (James 2:23, Isaiah 41:8, and 2 Chronicles 20:7) and the disciples of Jesus at the Last Supper (John 15:15).

⁴ I owe the term ‘second-person relatedness’ to a correspondence with Peter Hobson, whose work on related topics can be found here, Peter Hobson, ‘What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?’, in *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. by Naomi Eilan and others (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005), pp. 185–204. Hobson prefers ‘relatedness’ to ‘relationship’, which in English implies something more established than this broader category he desires to identify.

up, pointing, gaze following, reciprocal turn taking, and many kinds of play.⁵ This kind of interaction is plausible context for the origin of the unique second-person grammatical forms, and it is an empirical fact that children with atypical joint attention often make grammatical mistakes, notably failing to switch between ‘I’ and ‘you’ correctly when attempting to use second-person pronouns.⁶

All these interactions invite or directly involve someone sharing a stance toward a concrete or abstract object, a sharing that also involves an experience of the other person as being immediately present. For instance, a child pointing in a supermarket is inviting someone else, normally a harassed parent, to share the child’s interest in some object. As a working definition, this joint attention can be described as “*sharing an awareness of the sharing of focus,*” something “*that often entails sharing an attitude towards the thing or event in question.*”⁷ As these examples imply, this experience is extremely common across a vast range of human interactions from an extremely young age, implying that this kind of interaction is part of human nature. But this kind of interaction is also consistent with how Jesus describes the Holy Spirit as the Paraclete in the Christian life.⁸ This word is rendered as ‘advocate’, ‘helper’, ‘counsellor’, or ‘friend’ across Bible translations, but I think that these translations are unhelpful. ‘Paraclete’ literally means “the one called alongside.” In other words, Jesus is plausibly describing the interaction with the Holy Spirit as one of shared attention with God, with God as the co-attending subject of a human person in the Christian life, also called the life of grace.⁹

What might be the advantages of situating the kind of interaction with God manifested by Augustine within a broader category of shared attention with God? First, the love of friendship involves two desires, namely a desire for the good of the other and the desire for union or communion with the other.¹⁰ Both desires operate in embryonic form with God the Holy Spirit, given that shared attention with the Spirit often involves sharing a stance towards some object of attention as well as a meeting of minds with the other person. Second, the kind of deep friendship with God articulated by Augustine is a goal of the Christian life, but the long narratives of those finally described as friends of God in Scripture suggests

⁵ Naomi Eilan, ‘Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind’, in *Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology* (Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 1–33.

⁶ As Leo Kanner noted in his original description of the syndrome, and many subsequent studies have confirmed, children with extreme autism often refer to themselves as ‘you’ and the person they are speaking with as ‘I’ (Leo Kanner, ‘Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact’, *Nerv. Child*, 2 (1943), pp. 217–50). For example, the question, “How are you?” might elicit the response, “You are fine.” Such instances of pronoun reversal are not, however, common to children with other kinds of retarded learning conditions, such as Down Syndrome (Helen Tager-Flusberg, ‘Dissociations in Form and Function in the Acquisition of Language by Autistic Children: Studies of Atypical Children’, in *Constraints on Language Acquisition: Studies of Atypical Children*, ed. by Helen Tager-Flusberg (Erlbaum, 1994)).

⁷ Hobson, “What puts Jointness into Joint Attention?,” 185.

⁸ John 14:16, 14:26, 15:26, 16:7.

⁹ The explicit purpose of the Gospel of John, according to John 20:31, is to communicate the supernatural life of grace (*zōē*), made possible by the Incarnation and Atonement of the Son, and the sending of the Paraclete.

¹⁰ These two desires, drawn from Aquinas, are set out in Eric J. Silverman, *The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover* (Lexington Books, 2010), p. 59.

that second-person relatedness satisfies the need for a broader category for those who have started the journey towards the goal of divine friendship without yet fully achieving it.

So, I propose that the Christian life will ideally consist of a situation of shared attention or second-person relatedness with God, made possible only because of God's first causal action in offering the grace of a new life. This relatedness is oriented to divine friendship and already possesses the form of such friendship in an embryonic state. What then are the implications for Christian virtues?

Second-Person Virtue Ethics

Augustine did not write any systematic virtue ethics, even though he wrote a great deal about many individual virtues, which makes it difficult to examine his work directly regarding connections between second-person relatedness and virtue formation. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, however, the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas essentially puts the Christian anthropology of Augustine into a systematic form.¹¹ So I have concluded that Aquinas is a good guide to the virtue ethics of Augustine at a time in his life when he is living in intense second-person relatedness and divine friendship with God.

Although the virtue ethics of Aquinas has often been associated with Aristotle, this association is largely mistaken when it comes to Aquinas's own massive work on virtue ethics in *Summa theologiae* (ST), I-II, qq.55-70 and II-II, qq.1-170. Despite his great knowledge and respect for Aristotle's work, Aquinas's own account of virtue ethics is strikingly different from the *Nicomachean Ethics* and much more Augustinian than Aristotelian.¹² Aquinas has a very different lineup of major virtues from Aristotle, starting with faith, hope, and love, and adding a vast range of new secondary virtues, including humility and mercy. The deeper changes, however, are the addition of entirely new sets of perfective attributes unique to Judeo-Christian revelation. First, Aquinas includes new dispositions, namely gifts of the Holy Spirit drawn from patristic readings of Isaiah 11:1-2. So, Aquinas does not really have a virtue ethics but a virtue-and-gift ethics. Second, if one adds the two actualizations of these dispositions, namely the beatitudes from the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:3-9) and fruits of the Spirit from the Vulgate version of Galatians chapter 5, then Aquinas really has a virtue-gift-beatitude-fruit (VGBF) ethics, forming an organic whole that is clearly and radically non-Aristotelian.¹³

By my count, Aquinas gathers sixty-four perfective attributes into this structure, but the deeper meaning has long been elusive. In my work in 2012, however, I argued that the root metaphor for this structure is shared attention with God the Paraclete, an interaction made possible due to those virtues and

¹¹ Leo Kanner, 'Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact', *Nerv. Child*, 2 (1943), pp. 217–50.

¹² See Andrew Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics: Virtues and Gifts* (Routledge, 2012), ch. 1.

¹³ Aquinas's network of perfective attributes is described as an 'organic unity' in Servais Pinckaers, *Morality: The Catholic View*, trans. by Michael Sherwin (St. Augustine's Press, 2001), p. 87.

gifts of the Spirit that are infused, on Aquinas's reading, with the gift of grace.¹⁴ On this interpretation, the entirety of Aquinas's VGBF ethics can be understood in terms of joint attention or second-person relatedness with God. In this mode of interaction, we learn to love with God what God loves, and by extension, our second-person relatedness with other human persons in the same life of grace is radically modified from what it is in an ungraced human life. Moreover, second-person relatedness between human persons is plausibly the way in which we come to know other persons rather than simply knowing *about* other persons. Hence it is also plausible that second-person relatedness with God the Paraclete is not only the way in which virtues are formed in the Christian life, but the way in which we come to know God, which Jesus identifies as one of the characteristics of salvation (Matthew 7:21-23; 25:12).

What are some of the practical implications of this account of the meaning of virtue? Consider, for instance, the deceptively simple example of temperance. On an Aristotelian account, temperance is a mean between two vices of excess and deficiency, and this account is so simple that it is often used to teach virtue ethics in general. A careful consideration of what is regarded as virtuous behavior regarding food and drink, however, rapidly reveals a much richer account. Many meals, for example, involve formal conditions such as set times and place, using cutlery or parallel practices to lift food to our mouths, closing our mouths when eating, having moral norms about what is eaten, saying 'please' and 'thank you' when someone helps us, and having prayers to start and end meals. A careful examination of these behaviors reveals an underlying pattern, namely that they are all about enabling, protecting or nurturing second-person relatedness between human persons and adopt aspects of liturgies between human persons and God. For example, closing one's mouth when eating is actually quite difficult for children to learn, but closing the mouth not only shields others from the sight of food being chewed but protects the integrity of the human face, which has a privileged role in second-person relatedness.¹⁵ Moreover, the laying down of a tablecloth, the lighting of candles, and even the presence of bread and wine evokes a kind of sacramental sensibility about many kinds of formal meals.¹⁶

Second-person relatedness is also the key to understanding Aquinas's account of thirty-seven other virtues. To give one of the most important examples, consider the transformation of justice by the gift of piety, by which we are obliged to treat all living human beings as potentially or actually our brothers and sisters in Christ. A very dramatic example of this transformation is recorded in the *Letter to Philemon*, in which Paul has the delicate diplomatic task of writing on behalf of a runaway slave to his master when both the slave and the master have become Christians. He writes, Philemon 15-17,

¹⁴ Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics*.

¹⁵ Nancy L. Mindick and Glenn Alperin, *Understanding Facial Recognition Difficulties in Children: Prosopagnosia Management Strategies for Parents and Professionals* (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2010).

¹⁶ Andrew Pinsent, 'Temperance and the Second-Person Perspective', *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 12.3 (2020), pp. 101–15. Many of the virtuous social aspects of eating are also highlighted in Leon R. Kass, *The Hungry Soul: Eating And The Perfecting Of Our Nature*, New edition (University of Chicago Press, 1999).

Perhaps this is why he was parted from you for a while, that you might have him back for ever, no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother, especially to me but how much more to you, both in the flesh and in the Lord. So if you consider me your partner, receive him as you would receive me.¹⁷

In modern times, Christianity has faced criticism for not immediately opposing the institution of slavery from the time of its foundation, but I think this criticism fails to perceive the underling revolution brought about by the faith and highlighted in this passage.¹⁸ Paul urges Philemon to welcome the slave Onesimus back, “no longer as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother.” While it is true that Christian nations had some backsliding on this matter in early modern times, it is also true that slavery eventually became abhorrent for true Christians, aided by the results of a civil war in America and Britain’s Royal Navy waging war against the slave trade on the high seas.¹⁹ An abhorrence of slavery is a direct consequence of a second-person account of justice in the life of grace.

There are at least thirty-six other virtues in Aquinas’s account of virtue ethics, but the examples above should serve to highlight the radical change between Aristotelian and Augustinian-Thomistic virtue ethics, and the role of the latter in a state of flourishing in the Christian life.

Second-Person Virtue Practices Leading to Virtue

Given the thesis that a Christian should be living in a state of second-person relatedness with God, a state culminating in true virtues and divine friendship, I now want to consider these broader questions. Why are such virtues so important and what practices can assist in cultivating this state?

In answer to the first question, St John Henry Newman argues that holiness is not merely a requirement for heaven but the essential, internal state that makes heaven enjoyable. In his *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, he argues that without a holy character, an individual would find the presence of God miserable, not blessed. On this account, entry is heaven is not simply a matter of an external declaration but an internal transformation,

The more numerous are our acts of charity, self-denial, and forbearance, of course the more will our minds be schooled into a charitable, self-denying, and forbearing temper. The more frequent are our prayers, the more humble, patient, and religious are our daily deeds, this communion with God, these holy works, will be the means of making our hearts holy, and of preparing us for the future presence of God. Outward acts, done on principle, create inward habits. I repeat, the separate

¹⁷ In this paper, I am citing the translations of the Revised Standard Version.

¹⁸ For a contemporary account of the implications of the Christian revolution from an historical perspective, see Tom Holland, *Dominion: How the Christian Revolution Remade the World* (Basic Books, 2021).

¹⁹ See Anthony Sullivan, *Britain’s War Against the Slave Trade: The Operations of the Royal Navy’s West Africa Squadron, 1807–1867* (Frontline Books, 2023). In modern Brazilian Portuguese, there is still a phrase *para inglês ver* meaning “for the English to see.” When working in business in São Paulo I was told that this phrase originated from England’s campaign against the slave trade. The government enacted anti-slavery laws that were not applied in practice, but still convinced the English that there was progress against slave trade.

acts of obedience to the will of God, good works as they are called, are of service to us, as gradually severing us from this world of sense, and impressing our hearts with a heavenly character.²⁰

On Newman's account above, the implication is that these practices should permeate the entirety of a Christian life, gradually forming us into citizens of heaven. The work for these practices is meant to be carried out in this present life, and their cultivation could not have higher stakes for our own eternal happiness and our present life and society. So, what practices can assist in cultivating this state?

The thesis above is that the Christian life ought to consist of shared attention or second-person relatedness with God, which implies that these practices should also be second-personal between a human person and God the Paraclete, ideally also involving two or more Christians acting together. Second-person relatedness with God extends over a huge range of charitable actions, but when both the object and co-attending subject of these actions is God, then the specific action is Christian prayer. And when prayer involves two or more Christian acting together, then the matter in question is liturgy. What role, then, can liturgy play in cultivating second-person relatedness with God and its corresponding virtues?

When discussing this matter with my co-religionists, my principal focus would be on the Catholic Mass. Within the Catholic tradition, the Mass is the source and summit of the Christian life²¹ in which we love with God what God loves and sacrifice with God what God sacrifices. Unfortunately, however, contemporary Christians remain very divided over the nature and meaning of the Eucharist, so let me focus on another extremely important liturgy that is or ought to be universally accessible.

This liturgy is the Liturgy of the Hours or Divine Office, which consists principally of the Psalms of the Bible supplemented by other liturgical hymns from Scripture along with readings and other prayers and antiphons.²² In its modern form in the Latin Catholic Church, almost the entirety of one hundred and fifty Psalms is prayed either alone or in shared liturgies every four weeks. This practice is celebrated by Christians of Western and Eastern traditions including the Latin Catholic, Eastern Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Orthodox, Assyrian, Lutheran, Anglican, and some other Protestant communities.

In the case of the Divine Office, these words are those of the Psalms and other liturgical songs and prayers throughout Scripture. There are typically five offices a day: Office of Readings, Morning Prayer (Matins); Prayer during the Day; Evening Prayer (Vespers); and Night Prayer (Compline). These offices are prayed either individually or in congregations, and every cleric in the Catholic Church makes a promise at diaconal ordination to recite these prayers faithfully each day. Each office takes between seven and twenty minutes, adding up to about one and a quarter hours of liturgical prayer each day. As a

²⁰ See Sermon 1, "Holiness Necessary for Future Blessedness," in John Henry Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, New ed. (Longmans, Green, 1891). This text can be found at 'Newman Reader - Parochial & Plain Sermons 1 - Sermon 1', n.d. <<https://www.newmanreader.org/works/parochial/volume1/sermon1.html>> [accessed 23 April 2026].

²¹ Libreria Editrice Vaticana, *By Libreria Editrice Vaticana - Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2nd edition (USCCB, 2000), para. 1324.

²² *The Divine Office: The Liturgy of the Hours According to the Roman Rite*, (Collins, 1974).

personal practice, I have also slowly been memorizing the Psalms for over twenty years, using the same translations used in the Divine Office. Aquinas teaches that the soul is the form of the body (*ST*, I, q.76, a.1), which implies that memorizations that change the neural network of the body imprint the soul. With over fifty Psalms now imprinted on my neural network, I can testify that it has been enormously spiritually enriching to have these scriptures imprinted on my soul, available for use in prayer at almost any time. Hence the Psalms in practice also form a large part of my personal prayer each day.

All Christians would agree that God remains the first cause of virtue. Neither the Divine Office nor any other liturgical practice can guarantee that someone will grow in virtue and, indeed, the mere mouthing of such prayers is compatible with vice. Given, however, the need the need to grow in virtue in the context of knowing God, it makes sense that God would offer these means to assist our formation for eternity if we are disposed to receive this help. Moreover, as we also need to be formed for a life that we do not yet comprehend, it also makes sense that we should make extensive use of the words and forms that God has revealed rather than simply or solely extemporizing prayers. After all, our situation resembles that of Moses in Exodus 25. Just as Moses was instructed to build the Tabernacle according to the pattern of the heavenly sanctuary, we need to be guided by God's revelation in forming our souls.

In conclusion, my recommendations for second-person Christian practices in virtue formation are very simple for all those who are in a state of grace and open to be formed by God. Make good use of hallowed liturgical resources, of which I would particularly recommend the Divine Office, based principally on those Psalms that have been central to Judeo-Christian prayer for over twenty-five centuries. In praying these prayers, one can be confident that one is praying with the words of revelation. And if one is in a state of grace, namely second-person relatedness to God, one will be praying to God with God, and taking on God's stance in the forms of the virtues. As fruits of this regular practice, one will gradually come to love with God what God loves, and come to know and love the God of love.

What are the fruits of these practices like? As a metaphor for thinking about this question, consider learning to dance with another person, which requires several prerequisites, such as patience and a patient partner. I have some experience of this metaphor since, long before I became a priest, I was a dancer with the Oxford University Dance Team, competing against Cambridge University. My partner was a Russian girl who was a brilliant dancer and just a little scary. When I was first learning the steps, I cannot say that the process was much fun. But there came a point of qualitative transformation in which we became more than two individuals and were flying along without losing our individuality. From my formal training in physics, I would call this a state of *interpersonal resonance*. On this basis, when I wrote my book on Aquinas's virtue ethics, I described the fruits of the Holy Spirit that are the culmination of his Christian anthropology as resonances.²³ Indeed, Aquinas twice describes one of those fruits,

²³ Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas's Ethics*, ch. 4.

benignity, as a holy fire in which one ‘melts’ to relieve the needs of others (*ST* I-II, q.70, a.3; In Gal 5.6), implying that the virtues culminate in taking on some of the likeness of the flame of the Holy Spirit.

As corroboration that this choice of metaphor is appropriate, it is significant that Dante chose to use a similar illustration when faced with the poetic challenge of describing heaven. Indeed, in the fourth sphere of the *Paradiso*, Dante the poet depicts Dante the traveller encountering the soul of Aquinas himself in heaven,

So might you dimly guess (if mankind could)
what actual stars, joined in their double dance,
circled around the point on which I stood;

Though such experiences outrun our knowing.²⁴

In Dante’s *Paradiso*, all the souls communicate their states by means of symbolic activities. In the scene described above, the ‘stars’, that is, the souls in paradise, reveal their state by the image of a group dance. Although the image of dancing Dominicans might seem incongruous, the essential point is that Dante depicts the soul of Aquinas expressing his union with God, and with his companions in heaven, in terms of a harmonious activity, a context in which one can enjoy a perfect and immediate union with other persons. May God help us not to waste our time and opportunities to bring about these fruits.²⁵

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²⁴ Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. by John Ciardi (North American Library, 2003), *Paradiso*, Canto XIII, 705. Copyright 1954, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1965, 1967, 1970 by the Ciardi Family Publishing Trust. Used by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

²⁵ I am pleased to thank Eleonore Stump for discussions over many years pertaining to the themes of this paper.

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